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COMMENTARIES
NAFTA AND THE GATT: A REGIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE URUGUAY
ROUND
Peter McKellar*
As neither a lawyer nor a student of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), I do not propose to undertake the
traditional role of a commentator. However, I would like to com-
ment on a few of the points that were made by Professor Jack-
son and Professor Abbott in their very cogent papers. The first
is the institutional reform - or perhaps "completion" - of the
GATT, a principle which Canada strongly supports. Indeed, it
may be recalled that in 1990 Canada's then Minister of Interna-
tional Trade, John Crosbie, proposed the establishment of a
World Trading Organization in terms not unlike those proposed
by Professor Jackson. The Multinational Trade Negotiation
(MTN) discussions have made progress in this area and Canada
thinks that there are reasonable prospects for agreement at Ge-
neva, at least on a workplan leading toward the creation of such
a body.
I can also express the strong hope - and the word "strong"
is perhaps not strong enough - of the Canadian Government to
see a satisfactory resolution of the impasse on agriculture which
has crippled the current GATT negotiations begun at Punta del
Este, Uruguay in September 1986 (Uruguay Round). Through
the Cairns Group, as well as in the Uruguay Round negotiations,
Canada has worked very hard to achieve an agreement on the
reduction, if not elimination, of agricultural subsidies and over-
production. Canada has made this effort for the simple reason
that our agricultural sector continues to suffer enormously from
the international agricultural "subsidies war" between the
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United States and the European Economic Community. More-
over, support payments to Canadian producers have undermined
our government's efforts to reduce the federal budget deficit and
have distorted federal expenditure patterns. The November
1991 reports of an emerging compromise on the reduction of ag-
ricultural subsidies are therefore extremely encouraging and one
hopes they prove to be true.
I would also like to refer to one of the long list of issues
which the GATT will have to confront after the Uruguay Round
- the linkage between trade policy and environmental protec-
tion is part of the whole nexus of environmental challenges that
Canada and other countries are currently confronted with. In-
deed such linkage is starting to appear as an issue in our bilat-
eral trading relationship with the United States. One small ex-
ample is the recycling regulations for newsprint that are being
enacted by the various states. This example also demonstrates
that, whereas the GATT may bind national governments, it is
not always properly taken into account at other levels of govern-
ment. This question of application occurs at more than just the
province or state level. For example, Suffolk County in Long Is-
land, New York has mandated the recycling content of the news-
print for papers to be sold within the county.
NAFTA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
My contribution to this symposium is to look briefly at the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations,
and to try and place them in the context of the MTN and the
evolving GATT system.
Both the NAFTA negotiations and Canada's participation
in them are closely connected to the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement (FTA). That agreement in turn reflects the
very special nature of the Canada-United States economic rela-
tionship. Over one quarter of the Canadian gross national prod-
uct is generated through trade, and seventy-five percent of Ca-
nadian trade is with the United States (over 200 billion dollars
in goods and services last year). Moreover, over two-thirds of
Canadian exports to the United States are in just five commod-
ity groups: forestry, energy, metals and minerals, agriculture and
food products, and automobiles. Only the last group involves a
high percentage of value added products. A small number of
companies, only fifty, account for two-thirds of Canadian ex-
ports. It was the recognition of the inherent vulnerability in this
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situation that led the Canadian Government to initiate free
trade discussions with the United States as a means of securing
and improving Canadian access to the vital United States
market.
The FTA negotiations, more or less, coincided with the be-
ginning of the Uruguay Round. Canada has taken a very active
part in the Uruguay Round and the decision to try for a FTA
did not represent any decline in our strong commitment to an
open multilateral trading system. Rather, it marked our recogni-
tion that Canadian interests vis-d-vis the United States required
a bilateral arrangement consistent with, but complementary or
additional to, the provisions of the GATT.
The period since the launch of the Uruguay Round also co-
incided with the introduction of several basic changes in the eco-
nomic and trade policies of Mexico, including: its adhesion to
the GATT in 1986, its progressive reduction of tariff schedules
from 1985 onwards, its abolition of most import license require-
ments, the sale of some two-thirds of Mexican state companies,
the elimination of most quantitative restrictions on imports, the
great reduction in restrictions on foreign investment, etc.
When it became clear last year that Mexico would seek to
underpin these domestic reform measures with a new trading re-
lationship with the United States (which is as important a mar-
ket for Mexico as it is for us), Canada was obliged to decide
whether or not to take part in these negotiations, and, if so, in
what manner. Our decision to participate as a full partner re-
flected a number of economic and practical considerations and
objectives.
First, although the current level of Canadian trade with
Mexico is relatively modest, 2.2 billion dollars in 1990, compared
to well over 50 billion dollars between Mexico and the United
States, that figure has increased twenty-five percent since 1988.
A NAFTA would secure Canadian access to a Mexican market of
85 million people and create a single North American trading
framework consisting of 360 million people with six trillion dol-
lars in economic output.
Second, a NAFTA would institute a rule-based regime for
trade and investment among the three countries, offering cer-
tainty and predictability to traders and investors in all three.
Third, it would create a level playing field for investment
decisions. Separate Mexico-United States and Canada-United
States trade agreements would create a hub-and-spoke arrange-
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ment, that would clearly benefit the investment and production
activities in the United States far more than in either Mexico or
Canada.
Fourth, by participating in the NAFTA negotiations Canada
has an opportunity to influence them, so as to preserve, promote
and possibly expand the gains made through the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement. Government procurement and fi-
nancial services are two of the areas where we hope the NAFTA
will exceed the provisions of the FTA. The United States, of
course, has its own ideas on improvements. Canada and the
United States have agreed that the NAFTA may carry us for-
ward but should not take us backward by eroding the rights and
obligations we agreed to under the FTA.
Fifth, we believe it is in Canada's interest to support the
continuation of the economic and political reforms that the
Mexican Government is undertaking. Mexican adherence to the
NAFTA should serve to bind it, in some respects, to a market
economic system. The economic growth in Mexico, which can be
expected from the NAFTA, would mitigate the economic and so-
cial difficulties that have contributed to drug and emigration
problems, and should help Mexico improve its labor standards
and the enforcement of its environmental regulations. The
transparency and due process involved in maintaining and en-
forcing international trade standards in connection with the
NAFTA should also contribute to the reform of Mexico's admin-
istrative and judicial system.
As you know, we are in the midst of the NAFTA negotiating
process. The three responsible Ministers, Mrs. Hills, Sefior
Serra, and Mr. Wilson, have now met on three occasions, and
their chief negotiators have also met separately three times.
NAFTA working groups have had some five meetings each. Im-
portantly, the Ministers have agreed that in some areas draft
texts could be prepared and exchanged.
The NAFTA negotiations involve many areas of concern be-
tween the three countries. Specifically, these areas include:
- The exchange of initial tariff "offers" which took place in
September. All three governments agree that, at the end of an
appropriate transition period, all tariffs on all goods originating
in the free trade area will be eliminated.
- On rules of origin, the Canadian and United States ex-
periences under the FTA suggests that excessive reliance on a
"value-added" test to determine the country of origin may not
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provide the certainty and predictability that businessmen need,
nor the objectivity in administration that governments deserve.
The three countries are, therefore, exploring whether a simpler
"origin" test, such as a change of tariff classification heading
under the Harmonized System, might be used.
- We are also concerned that other border measures may
become impediments to trade. Quantitative restrictions, import
licensing, and a range of Mexican nontariff barriers should be
subject to appropriate disciplines, as are found in the FTA.
- Canada seeks expanded opportunities in both the United
States and Mexican Government procurement markets. Mexico
is not a member of the GATT Government Procurement Code,
and we thus are seeking, through the NAFTA, to provide Cana-
dian businesses with access to the Mexican Government pro-
curement market under a reformed, code-based regime. As be-
tween the United States and Canada, the FTA currently covers
only specified entities with respect to certain specified
purchases. Neither sub-national nor federally-funded procure-
ment is addressed, and government purchases administered
under small business or minority purchasing programs are ex-
cluded. The NAFTA negotiations are providing an opportunity
to pry open a larger part of government purchasing in the
United States to international, market-based competition.
- The negotiation of technical standards is a particularly
challenging area. On the one hand, such standards can be used
for protectionist ends. On the other hand, each country must
maintain the right to set health, sanitary, safety, and environ-
mental objectives. The negotiators are seeking to strike the right
balance between these two concerns. A similar discussion is
nearing conclusion in the Uruguay Round which would revise
the GATT Technical Barriers to Trade Code.
- The FTA shows that services and investment can, and
should, be the subject of trade disciplines, such as national
treatment and non-discrimination. The MTN negotiations have
clarified that the "right of establishment" or "right of commer-
cial presence" is really but one aspect of ensuring effective op-
portunities to goods producers and service providers to compete
across borders. Accordingly, in the NAFTA, negotiators are
looking closely at the relationships involved in the investment
and service disciplines.
- The three parties are placing a high priority on ratifying
and implementing the Uruguay Round results on Trade Related
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Intellectual Property (TRIPS).
- The trade remedy universe - "contingency protection"
- was the most contentious issue in the FTA negotiations. In
the NAFTA, Canada and the United States are concerned with
ensuring that emergency reliet, in the form of temporary safe-
guard measures, is available to those private companies who face
unexpected import competition during the transition period. As
it relates to antidumping and countervailing duties, Chapter 19
of the FTA will continue to apply as between Canada and the
United States; it remains to be determined whether and how it
might be applied or extended to Mexico.
Institutional and Dispute Settlement arrangements should
flow from the substantive provisions of the agreement. To en-
sure the agreement fulfills the objectives set by the three govern-
ments, these arguments must provide timely, effective and effi-
cient means for the avoidance and amicable resolution of
differences.
The foregoing reflects the fact that we are still in the midst
of negotiations and have not reached the resolution stage.
An important question that will need to be resolved is the
relationship between the NAFTA, the FTA, the GATT, and the
other trade agreements, such as between Mexico and Chile. The
FTA has been described as a "GATT-Plus" agreement; it reaf-
firms the two countries' GATT obligations, which continue to
apply unless otherwise provided in the FTA. The NAFTA
should follow the same principle. It should be a "GATT-Plus,
FTA-Plus" Agreement. Neither Canada nor the United States is
seeking to renegotiate the FTA. Any changes to the FTA will be
made only if both countries consider them to be genuine im-
provements. If such improvements are not agreed to, then the
existing provisions of the FTA will continue to apply between
Canada and the United States.
Regarding the relationship of the NAFTA to the GATT sys-
tem, there are two points to be made. First, a successful NAFTA
will create a precedent for the negotiation of new, complex con-
tractual trade arrangements involving developed and developing
countries.
As you know, Mexico stood aloof from much of the post war
trade negotiation framework. It waited almost thirty years from
the GATT's inception to become a member, and the Uruguay
Round marks only its second active participation in GATT ne-
gotiations. Moreover, as was pointed out earlier, the obligations
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for developing countries under the GATT rules are considerably
less demanding, overall, than those for industrialized parties.
NAFTA can be expected to create much stricter contractual ob-
ligations for Mexico than it has heretofore faced. Indeed, since
the NAFTA negotiating agenda largely tracks the contents of
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, the NAFTA
negotiations may be considered, in some respects, to mark Mex-
ico's international legal graduation to the club of more-devel-
oped or industrialized trading nations.
Thus, the NAFTA will illuminate and help define issues and
standards for future agreements involving developing countries
in Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere. It can also be expected
that, over time, such agreements will have implications for the
developing countries' positions at the GATT in Geneva concern-
ing some, or all, of the differential provisions from which they
now benefit. For example, once the NAFTA is in place it will
become more difficult for Mexico to sustain one position under
the GATT while having accepted a more stringent obligation
under the NAFTA.
Second, the NAFTA must be looked at as one element of an
emerging new trade relations system, built on the same princi-
ples as the original GATT but more attuned to the problems of
today. Transparency, due process, nondiscrimination, and open
markets remain as valid as they were forty years ago, but they
translate into different commitments today that reflect the
greater degree of international economic integration and
interdependence.
Today's challenges are not the same as those of forty or fifty
years ago - curbing protectionism at the border - but involve
addressing the trade distorting dimensions of domestic policy:
the need to broaden the application of national treatment to
new areas, such as investment, agricultural support programs,
competition policy and intellectual property protection. These
additional issues are more complex to negotiate and require a
more flexible and nuanced approach. This approach is the much
broader front along which negotiations are now proceeding
under the Uruguay Round. A successful NAFTA, far from sup-
planting or weakening the GATT system, should help
strengthen and affirm it. In the process it will help foster a new
era of international economic growth, just as the GATT did in
the 1940s.
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